“Look then to be well edified, when the fool delivers the madman”: Insider-Trading Regulation After Salman v. United States by Walsh, James
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 3
2017
“Look then to be well edified, when the fool delivers
the madman”: Insider-Trading Regulation After
Salman v. United States
James Walsh
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
James Walsh, “Look then to be well edified, when the fool delivers the madman”: Insider-Trading Regulation After Salman v. United States, 67
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 979 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol67/iss3/16
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
979 
—  Comment  — 
“Look then to be well edified, 
when the fool delivers the 
madman”1: Insider-Trading 
Regulation after  
Salman v. United States 
“Today, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously and ‘easily’ rejec-
ted the Second Circuit’s novel reinterpretation of insider trading 
law in U.S. v. Newman. In its swiftly decided opinion, the Court 
stood up for common sense and affirmed what we have been ar-
guing from the outset—that the law absolutely prohibits insiders 
from advantaging their friends and relatives at the expense of the 
trading public. Today’s decision is a victory for fair markets and 
those who believe that the system should not be rigged.” 
—Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York – December 6, 20162 
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Introduction 
Perhaps the above quote tells the reader everything she needs to 
know about the case in question. After all, Justice Alito pointed to the 
writing on the wall when he declared that “this case involves ‘precisely 
 
1. William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, in The Norton Shakespeare 
V.1.85–86 (Stephen Greenblatt et al. eds., 2015). 
2. Colby Hamilton, Bharara Praises Supreme Court Decision on Insider 
Trading, Politico (Dec. 6, 2016, 12:33 PM), http://www.politico.com/ 
states/new-york/albany/story/2016/12/scotus-insider-trading-decision-hailed-
as-a-victory-by-bharara-107844 [https://perma.cc/84M3-T7GB]. 
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the gift of confidential information to a trading relative’ that Dirks3 
envisioned.”4 Hence, what can we take away from an opinion that, in 
both result and diction, is unequivocally clear? As legal scholars, we 
know that judicial restraint leaves open enough questions to keep the 
well of Note and Comment topics from running dry. In that spirit, the 
following pages explore the interstices in Justice Alito’s opinion, specifi-
cally the plausible ambiguities the Court mentions but, in the name of 
judicial restraint, purposefully declines to address.5 
Along these lines, circuit splits often result in countless speculative 
works of legal scholarship.6 But in Salman v. United States,7 the Sup-
reme Court laid to rest the question of whether the government can 
convict a tippee who trades on inside information if the sole benefit to 
 
3. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks established that liability for insider 
trading may arise when an insider makes a gift of confidential information 
to a trading relative or friend. Id. at 664.  
4. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (quoting United States 
v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
5. See infra Part III (discussing insider trading regulation after Salman). 
6. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, An Insider Trading Case Heads to the Supreme 
Court, 2016–2017 Sup. Ct. Preview 78, 81 (2016) (predicting correctly 
that, in Salman, “the government [will] . . . get what it wanted in the 
Newman case . . . a broad reading of liability for tipping inside information”); 
Rachel K. Paulose, Must a Tipper Receive a Pecuniary Benefit to Establish 
Liability in Insider Trading Cases?, 44 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 11, 14 
(2016) (predicting that “[a] reversal of Salman would be consistent with the 
Court’s concern that the government prove scienter in criminal cases”); 
Zachary J. Gubler, Comment, Reframing United States v. Salman, 165 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. Online 1, 8–9 (2016) (arguing that “the Court should clarify 
that insider trading liability results from the misappropriation of information, 
and under that theory of liability, tipper-tippee liability is not dependent on 
a personal benefit,” which is farther than the Court was willing to go); 
Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman “Gift 
Theory” of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading 
Law, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 833, 858 (2016) (predicting correctly that the 
Court will “uphold the ‘gift theory’ of the personal benefit requirement for 
tipper-tippee insider trading liability”); Shannon Seiferth, Note, No More 
Quid Pro Quo: Abandoning the Personal Benefit Requirement in Insider 
Trading Law, 50 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 175, 214 (2016) (arguing that 
Congress should pass a statute that “prevent[s] insider trading in the sort of 
circumstances where it seems morally reprehensible, without chilling the use 
of inside information for legitimate business purposes”); Sara Almousa, 
Comment, Friends with Benefits? Clarifying the Role Relationships Play in 
Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement under Tipper-Tippee Liability, 
23 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1251, 1280 (2016) (predicting correctly that, 
“[w]hile the Court finally agreed to rule on the [personal-benefit] issue, it will 
more likely adopt one of the circuit court’s interpretations”). 
7. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
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the tipper is their relationship with a “trading relative or friend.”8 
Absent a tangible benefit to the tipper, this “gift-theory” of liability9 
permits the government to convict a trading tippee exclusively because 
of their relationship with the tipper.10 Salman, therefore, refined the 
understanding of a “personal benefit” in insider-trading law.11 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Salman’s appeal from the 
Ninth Circuit because of a contemporaneous and diverging opinion by 
the Second Circuit,12 which resulted in the aforementioned circuit 
split.13 In United States v. Newman,14 the Second Circuit overturned 
the tippees’ convictions on the grounds that the tippers, who were 
corporate insiders that indirectly passed inside information to the 
tippees via the tippees’ analysts,15 did not receive a “personal benefit” 
from their tips.16 This prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari 
in Salman, which culminated in a resounding win for the government.17 
Since “circuit splits [are purported to] . . . provide a reliable and 
objective measure of judicial performance,”18 we are poised to review 
Justice Alito’s opinion in Salman, which the Court joined 
 
8. See id. at 427 (holding that a tipper breaches their fiduciary duty by making 
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend).  
9. To demonstrate, Justice Ginsburg asked Defense Counsel what would 
happen if the insider made the trade themselves and then gifted the proceeds 
to the relative. Defense counsel agreed that the insider would be guilty under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012), to 
which Justice Ginsburg remarked “So what’s the difference, if the insider 
trades and . . . makes the proceeds a gift, or if he just says, you do the trade; 
here’s the gift?” Oral Argument at 1:32, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 
420 (2016) (No. 15-628), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-628 [https:// 
perma.cc/AP4W-6G43].  
10. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 429. 
11. Id. at 423. 
12. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
13. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 (“We granted certiorari to resolve the tension 
between the Second Circuit’s Newman decision and the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision in this case.”). 
14. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
15. Id. at 442. 
16. Id. 
17. See Aruna Viswanatha & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Hardens Stance on 
Insider Trading, Wall St. J. (Dec. 7, 2016, 1:44 PM), http://www. 
wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-backs-prosecutors-over-tips-from-friends-and-
family-in-insider-trading-cases-1481038798 [https://perma.cc/VD6B-NW4Q] 
(arguing that “the unanimous opinion [in Salman] restores some of the power 
the government lost in a 2014 federal court case”). 
18. Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit 
Split Resolutions, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1145, 1161 (2011). 
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unanimously,19 and evaluate how it impacts the future of insider-trading 
jurisprudence, specifically in the realm of “personal benefit.” 
I. Overview of the “Personal Benefit” Requirement 
Under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193420 and Rule 
10b-5,21 which the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated 
pursuant to its powers under § 10(b), a person is guilty of insider 
trading if the Government can prove: “(i) the existence of a relationship 
affording access to information intended to be available only for a 
corporate purpose, and (ii) unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to 
take advantage of that information by trading without [public] dis-
closure.”22 Wang and Steinberg describe the combination of § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 as “one of the most potent weapons” in the federal arsenal 
for policing insider trading.23 Defense counsel in Salman, however, cor-
rectly argued that “no statute defines the elements of [insider 
trading].”24 The crime is a species of what some commentators call “fed-
eral common law.”25 Thus, for “personal benefit” purposes, our inquiry 
focuses on the second prong of this two-prong test, which the SEC 
 
19. Supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
22. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); see also Juliet P. 
Kostritsky, Comment, Rationalizing Liability for Nondisclosure under 10b-
5: Equal Access to Information and United States v. Chiarella, 1980 Wis. 
L. Rev. 162, 192 (1980) (explaining that “[t]he test based on the presence 
or absence of a motive to obtain personal profit goes to the heart of 10b-5, 
which is a concern that depriving investors of equal access to information 
can impair investor confidence and the capital markets”). 
23. William K.S. Wang & Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading § 1.2, 3 
(3d ed. 2010). 
24. Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 0:32. Defense Counsel went on to argue 
that “this is a statute that doesn’t even mention insider trading, much less 
tipping or personal benefit.” Id. at 1:50; see also United States v. Newman, 
773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[N]either the statute nor the regulations 
issued pursuant to it, including Rule 10b-5, expressly prohibit insider trading. 
Rather, the unlawfulness of insider trading is predicated on the notion that 
insider trading is a type of securities fraud proscribed by Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.” (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226–30)). 
25. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Law and Policy 29 
(2014) (“The modern insider trading prohibition thus is a creature of SEC 
administrative actions and judicial opinions, only loosely tied to the statutory 
language and its legislative history.”). 
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announced in the seminal case In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,26 and the 
Supreme Court subsequently adopted in Chiarella.27 
In Cady, Roberts, the SEC opined that “information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose” must also “not [be] for the per-
sonal benefit of anyone.”28 This applies to the tipper, the tippee, and 
even the elusive second- and third-level (and beyond) “remote tip-
pees.”29 We will come to appreciate, however, that the chief concern for 
tippees is whether the tipper receives a personal benefit from their tip.30 
Nonetheless, “personal benefits” come in both obvious and not-so-ob-
vious forms,31 some of which we will survey to grasp the possible impli-
cations of the “personal benefit” test after Salman.32 
Following Cady, Roberts, courts have continued to distill the term 
“personal benefit,” perhaps most notably in the landmark case Dirks v. 
SEC.33 In Dirks, the Supreme Court held that “the initial inquiry is 
whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider,” which “requires 
courts to focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a 
direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as pecuniary 
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.”34 
Because Dirks was essentially a whistleblower to a massive fraud, 
however, the Court had difficulty applying this framework to him.35 He 
was not a company insider and, in fact, some argue that his disclosure 
played a vital role in uncovering one of the most egregious accounting 
frauds in American history.36 Thus, it was not immediately clear what 
 
26. 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). 
27. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222. 
28. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC at 912 (emphasis added). 
29. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25 at 64–65 (arguing that although 
“remote tippees” can be liable for insider trading, “it often will be difficult 
to prosecute tipping chain cases, because of the potential difficulties inherent 
in proving the requisite knowledge on the part of remote tippees”). 
30. See id. at 59 (“What Dirks proscribes is not a breach of any duty, however, 
but solely a breach of the duty of loyalty forbidding fiduciaries to personally 
benefit from the disclosure.”) (emphasis added). 
31. See id. at 60–61 (explaining that a “personal benefit” can arise from many 
situations, some of which are a quid pro quo, a reputational benefit, sexual 
favors, and gifts). 
32. See infra Part III (discussing the enforcement of insider trading laws after 
Salman). 
33. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).  
34. Id. at 663. 
35. Id. at 654. 
36. See id. at 652 n.8 (explaining that “[l]argely thanks to Dirks one of the most 
infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered and exposed, while the 
record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to investigate 
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the tipper’s benefit was in revealing this information to Dirks. Yet, the 
Government still attempted to satisfy this requirement to justify an 
insider-trading conviction against him. Justice Powell clarified, how-
ever, “that there is no general duty to disclose before trading on mater-
ial nonpublic information.”37 Further, Justice Powell explained that 
“not ‘all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities trans-
action’ . . . come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5.”38 The requisite con-
cern is whether the breach of fiduciary duty is the result of deliberate 
“manipulation or deception.”39 
Still, the Government persisted in its argument that Dirks “breach-
ed a duty which he had assumed as a result of knowingly receiving 
confidential information from [Equity Funding] insiders,”40 and that 
“tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public, material information 
from insiders become ‘subject to the same duties as [the] insiders.’”41 
But this argument did not sway the Dirks Court; it summarily rejected 
this reasoning and held that “the test is whether the insider personally 
will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.”42 Because the 
insiders did not personally benefit from Dirks’s disclosure, there was no 
breach of duty to the shareholders, and because the insiders did not 
breach their duty, “there [was] no derivative breach” by Dirks.43 
The Dirks Court based its decision on the fact that “the tippers 
received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s 
secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to 
Dirks.”44 Hence, the Court overturned Dirks’s conviction because “the 
tippers were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud,”45 not to receive 
 
Equity Funding”) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 
1982)); but see Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 43 n.16 (“The extent to which 
Dirks should be credited with exposing the Equity Funding fraud is a matter 
of debate. Arguably, it was not until state insurance regulators from California 
and Illinois conducted a surprise audit of an Equity Funding subsidiary that 
the fraud actually came to light.”) (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 669 n.2 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting)). 
37. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654. 
38. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)). 
39. Dirks, 463 U.S. 654 (quoting Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 473). 
40. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655–56 (quoting In re Dirks, 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1410 
n.42 (1981)). 
41. Dirks, 463 U.S. 656 (quoting Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
42. Id. at 662. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 667. 
45. Id. 
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a personal or reputational benefit, or to make a gift to Dirks. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Salman centers on the Second 
and Ninth Circuits’ uneven application of the principles enunciated in 
Dirks.46 
II. Mirror Opposites: United States v. Newman  
& Salman v. United States 
Because Salman and Newman both involved “tippee” liability, the 
key issue in both cases was that the tippers did not receive any tangible 
benefit for their tips. In both instances, the insiders tipped off family 
members or professional friends who then tipped off others. Eventually, 
“remote tippees” down the line traded on the material nonpublic infor-
mation.47 The “misappropriation doctrine” of insider trading, which is 
“when a [non-insider] trades on or tips material nonpublic information 
in breach of a duty to the information source,”48 encompasses situations 
like Salman and Newman. 
The “misappropriation theory”49 is distinct from the “classical 
theory” of insider trading in which “a corporate insider . . . trades ‘in 
the corporation’s securities on the basis of material, nonpublic informa-
tion about the corporation,’ for his or her own benefit.”50 In the “mis-
appropriation doctrine,” as Justice Alito explained, “the tippee acquires 
the tipper’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows 
the information was disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty.”51 Further, 
“the tippee may commit securities fraud by trading in disregard of that 
knowledge.”52 This is so because, as the Second Circuit noted, “the Sup-
reme Court explicitly rejected the notion of ‘a general duty between all 
participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, 
 
46. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 (2016). 
47. Id. at 423–24 (“Salman received lucrative trading tips from an extended 
family member, who had received the information from Salman’s brother-in-
law.”); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(“[Defendants were] three and four levels removed from the inside tipper, 
respectively.”). 
48. Wang & Steinberg, supra note 23, at § 5.4, 411. 
49. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997) (explaining that 
the misappropriation theory defines securities fraud as misappropriation of 
confidential information in breach of a duty to the source). 
50. Id. (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 445). 
51. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 423. 
52. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017 
Insider-Trading Regulation after Salman v. United States 
986 
nonpublic information.’”53 Thus, to be guilty of insider trading, the tip-
pee must know that the insider breached a duty by giving the tip. Ir-
respective of the form of insider trading, the elements are the same for 
both the classical theory and the misappropriation doctrine.54 
In Newman, two defendants traded in Dell and NVIDIA stock after 
they heard news of the companies’ “earnings numbers before they were 
publicly released.”55 This generated large windfalls for their respective 
hedge funds.56 In the Dell trade, the insider shared inside information 
with a former Dell coworker who by that time was working on Wall 
Street.57 The Government introduced evidence “that the [Dell] insider 
sought career advice from his ‘friend’ and that his friend edited the 
insider’s resume and sent it to a Wall Street recruiter.”58 In the NVIDIA 
trade, the insider shared information with a friend from church with 
whom he “occasionally socialized.”59 Neither the former Dell employee 
nor the church friend traded on the inside information, but after several 
steps down the chain, the “hedge fund managers . . learned the infor-
mation and used it to trade in Dell and NVIDIA.”60 
Newman went up to the Second Circuit on appeal because the 
defendants argued that “the district court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury that it must find that a tippee knew that the insider disclosed 
confidential information in exchange for a personal benefit.”61 The Gov-
ernment insisted that “Newman and Chiasson were criminally liable for 
insider trading because, as sophisticated traders, they must have known 
that information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a fiduciary duty, 
 
53. Newman, 773 F.3d at 445 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 
233 (1980)). 
54. Id. at 446 (citing SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285–86 (2d. Cir. 2012)). 
55. Id. at 443. 
56. See Jon Eisenberg, “Friends” Who Trade on Inside Information: How 
United States v. Newman Changes the Law, K&L Gates (Apr. 20, 2015), 
http://www.klgates.com/friends-who-trade-on-inside-information-how-united-
states-v-newman-changes-the-law-04-20-2015/ [https://perma.cc/5LBG-
ZPU5] (“Newman involved two defendants who traded in Dell and NVIDIA 
and, as a result of those trades, made $4 million and $68 million for their 
funds.”). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id.; see also United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(“Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed from the corporate 
insiders and there was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the 
inside information.”).  
61. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442 (emphasis added). 
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and not for any legitimate corporate purpose.”62 But the Second Circuit 
did not agree; instead, it overturned the convictions on the grounds 
“that the district court’s instruction failed to accurately advise the jury 
of the law.”63 
After reading the Newman opinion, it is apparent that the Second 
Circuit was reluctant to expand insider-trading liability beyond its est-
ablished parameters. For example, the Court explained “that the Gov-
ernment has not cited, nor have we found, a single case in which tippees 
as remote as Newman and Chiasson have been held criminally liable for 
insider trading.”64 Further, the Court cautioned that, “although the 
Government might like the law to be different, nothing in the law re-
quires a symmetry of information in the nation’s securities markets.”65 
We may, in turn, read Newman as a departure from Dirks because the 
Second Circuit held that “the Government must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the tippee knew that an insider disclosed confidential 
information and that he did so in exchange for a personal benefit.”66 
Requiring concrete proof that a tippee “knew” the tipper made the tip 
in exchange for a “personal benefit” is a considerably more difficult test 
when it comes to prosecuting “remote tippees;” but whether this is 
sound policy is the province of the next Part.67 Still, it is necessary to 
note that the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Salman occurred 
alongside the Second Circuit’s radical deviation in Newman. The key 
takeaway from Newman is the Second Circuit’s holding that a jury may 
only infer a “personal benefit” if there is proof of “a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, con-
sequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature.”68 But whether Newman remains good law 
after Salman is not entirely clear.69 
 
62. Id. at 443–44. 
63. Id. at 450. 
64. Id. at 448. 
65. Id. at 448–49. 
66. Id. at 442. 
67. Infra Part III. 
68. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452; but see Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 
422 (2016) (“To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also 
receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange 
for a gift to family or friends . . . we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this 
requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”) (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
69. See Jen Wieczner, Here’s What the Supreme Court Insider Trading Ruling 
Means for Hedge Funds, Fortune (Dec. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/ 
2016/12/06/supreme-court-insider-trading-salman-hedge-fund/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4QC7-5F9W] (“The Salman decision wouldn’t have been enough 
to put Newman in jail because ‘this case does not implicate those issues,’ the 
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In Salman, Maher Kara worked for the healthcare group at Citi-
group and began to share inside information about the company’s mer-
gers and acquisitions with his brother, Michael Kara.70 Early on, Maher 
suspected that Michael was trading on the information, but later, after 
a course of years, he concluded that Michael was indeed making illegal 
trades.71 Michael also began sharing this information with Bassam Sal-
man, who, in the meantime, had become Maher’s brother-in-law after 
Maher’s marriage to his sister.72 Salman and an accomplice eventually 
received a windfall of over $1.5 million from their illegal trades,73 and 
it was clear Salman knew the source of the information. According to 
the Government, “it was also important to Michael that [Salman knew] 
that Maher was the tipper; Michael hoped it would make Maher seem 
more powerful and prosperous in the eyes of the Salman family.”74 In 
Part III I argue that this hankering for “recognition” is a tell-tale sign 
that the tipper received a “personal benefit.” We should have faith in 
the fact-finding process to search out evidence of a tipper’s desire for 
“recognition” (as it did in Salman). If the Government can prove that 
the tipper desired “recognition”75 in exchange for their tip, whether rep-
utational, altruistic, or professional, then that should be enough to sa-
tisfy the “personal benefit” test. 
Justice Alito’s opinion begins by reiterating that the test is 
“whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the infor-
mation . . . for a personal benefit [which] . . . a jury can infer . . . where 
the tipper receives something of value,” including a gift of information 
to “a trading relative or friend.”76 Salman’s central argument was that 
“he [could not] be held liable as a tippee because the tipper . . . did not 
personally receive money or property in exchange for the tips and thus 
did not personally benefit from them.”77 In other words, Salman offered 
a pure “pecuniary gain” reading of the Dirks “personal benefit” 
 
Court wrote in a footnote to its opinion Tuesday. Indeed, the Salman de-
cision doesn’t clearly define what the Supreme Court considers a ‘friend.’”). 
70. Brief for the United States at 3, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628).  
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 5. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 6. 
75. The Oxford English Living Dictionary defines recognition as “[a]ppreciation 
or acclaim for an achievement, service or ability.” Recognition, Oxford 
Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/recognition 
[https://perma.cc/S9DV-FA2K] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017). 
76. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)). 
77. Id. at 424. 
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standard. But, in Michael Kara’s own words, his insider brother gave 
him “timely information that the average person does not have access 
to,” including “access to stocks, options, and [things] . . . the average 
person would never have or dream of.”78 
Despite this palpable advantage, Salman raised three predominant 
claims to innocence: (1) in the criminal-fraud context, the Government 
must prove that the fraudster personally obtained money or property, 
and the same standard should apply to insider trading; (2) defining a 
gift as a personal benefit is “indeterminate, because liability may turn 
on facts such as the closeness of the relationship between tipper and 
tippee and the tipper’s purpose for disclosure;” and (3) defining a gift 
as a personal benefit is also “overbroad, because the Government may 
avoid having to prove a concrete personal benefit by simply arguing 
that the tipper meant to give a gift to the tippee.”79 Salman also raised 
a few ancillary arguments, citing “constitutional concerns” and diffi-
culties arising out of “remote tippee” scenarios.80 
On the other side, the Government argued “that a gift of confiden-
tial information to anyone, not just a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is 
enough to prove securities fraud.”81 The Court was not willing to extend 
the Dirks “personal benefit” test that far, but it still quickly sounded 
the death knell for Salman’s arguments. The Court held that, in Sal-
man’s case, “the tipper benefit[ted] personally because giving a gift of 
trading information is the same thing as trading by the tipper followed 
by a gift of the proceeds.”82 And although the Court conceded that “in 
some factual circumstances assessing liability for gift-giving will be diffi-
cult,”83 it concluded that “Salman’s conduct [was] in the heartland of 
Dirks’s rule concerning gifts.”84 Outside of this gift-giving “heartland,” 
we can only speculate as to how far future courts will extend the Dirks 
“personal benefit” test, especially since the Salman Court reaffirmed it 
on the narrowest possible grounds. 
III. Insider-Trading Enforcement after Salman 
Before delving into some hypothetical “remote tippee” scenarios 
post-Salman, it is necessary to address the policy issues that underlie 
all insider-trading prosecutions. Among these policy considerations are: 
 
78. Id. at 425. 
79. Id. at 426. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 428. 
83. Id. at 428–29. 
84. Id. at 429. 
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(1) adhering to the rule of lenity and providing clear standards to ensure 
just imposition of criminal liability under the securities laws;85 (2) per-
mitting market participants to develop insights about companies with-
out fear of criminal repercussions, which facilitates market efficiency 
and effectuates pricing mechanisms;86 (3) dismantling the uncertainty 
surrounding the “patchwork of judicial decisions cobbling together, on 
a case-by-case basis, what conduct gives rise to liability;”87 (4) respec-
ting separation of powers, especially because Rule 10b-5 “does not ex-
pressly prohibit insider trading”;88 (5) preventing the “crowding out” 
effect89 and earnings manipulation that springs from insider trading and 
impairs market efficiency;90 and (6) ensuring that securities markets are 
not “rigged in favor of the well-connected and the influential.”91 
These competing interests center on two major concerns: (1) priorit-
izing Congressional statutes over “judge-made” law; and (2) protecting 
market efficiency and integrity, which mean different things to different 
 
85. See Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the N.Y. 
Council of Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, 
Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s rule would 
criminalize a broad swath of conduct as to which Section 10(b) is at best 
ambiguous, the rule of lenity compels a narrower reading of that provision 
here.”); see also Brief of the NYU Center on the Admin. of Criminal Law as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 3, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 
15-628) (“Criminal liability should not turn on a fact-finder’s evaluation of 
how friendly a tipper and tippee are, or whether a tippee’s assistance to the 
tipper meets some arbitrary threshold of significance.”). 
86. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n in Support of 
Neither Party at 10, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628) (“If the markets 
are to operate with optimal efficiency, it is critical that the analyst (and any 
compliance officer asked to assist) be able to quickly and reliably determine 
whether trading and recommendations are permitted or prohibited in the 
circumstances presented.”). 
87. Brief of Amicus Curiae Mark Cuban in Support of Petitioner at 2, Salman, 
137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628). 
88. Brief for Amicus Curiae Cato Inst. in Support of Petitioner at 2, Salman, 
137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628). 
89. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading, in The Concise Encyclopedia 
of Economics (David R. Henderson ed., 2008), http://www.econlib 
.org/library/Enc/InsiderTrading.html [https://perma.cc/25EQ-797W] (“The 
‘outside’ search for information [by analysts] is more socially valuable, even 
if it is occasionally more costly, [because] trading by corporate insiders may 
crowd out securities research on external factors.”) (emphasis added). 
90. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Richard D. Freer in Support of Respondent at 
12, Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628) (“[I]n developed economies, insider 
trading can harm pricing efficiency.”). 
91. Brief of Occupy the SEC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, 
Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420 (No. 15-628). 
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people.92 The most common judicial precedent cited in opposition to an 
all-encompassing insider-trading prohibition comes from Justice Po-
well’s majority opinion in Dirks: “The SEC expressly recognized that 
‘[t]he value to the entire market of [analysts’] efforts cannot be gainsaid; 
market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by [their] initia-
tives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the analyst’s work 
redounds to the benefit of all investors.’”93 This market efficiency con-
sideration is a major impediment to the adoption of a hardline stance 
against all insider trading, particularly when market analysts extract 
inside information and remote tippees trade on it.94 But, as we will see, 
this apprehension to apply stiff insider trading laws because they might 
stifle the work of true market professionals is misguided. After all, “mar-
ket professionals . . . spend significant time and resources digging up 
non-inside information about the economy and individual firms,” but 
“if insider trading were legal, it’s possible that all this work may not be 
worth it [and] . . . if these market professionals leave the market as a 
result, it could lead to much less efficient markets.”95 In other words, 
market professionals who conduct business the old-fashioned way are 
largely responsible for keeping markets efficient, not the inside traders 
who prey on the “efficient capital markets” argument as a form of trade 
protectionism for their own crooked advantage.96 
 
92. See, e.g., Wang & Steinberg, supra note 23, at § 2.2.2, 20 (“Arguably, 
market efficiency is similarly enhanced by all insider trading, even by execu-
tives of the issuer. All such trading will move prices in the correct direction, 
especially if the market discerns that insider trading is taking place.”); but 
see Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 183 (“The problem is that while deri-
vatively informed [i.e. “insider trading”] can affect price, it functions slowly 
and sporadically. Given the inefficiency of derivatively informed trading, the 
market efficiency justification for insider trading loses much of its force.”). 
93. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 n.17 (1983). 
94. Doug Bandow, It’s Time to Legalize Insider Trading, Forbes (Jan. 20, 2011, 
1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2011/01/20/legalize-insider-trading-
economics-opinions-contributors-doug-bandow.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R9UM-BPPQ] (“The objective of insider trading laws is counter-intuitive 
[sic]: prevent people from using and markets from adjusting to the most 
accurate and timely information. The rules target “non-public” information, a 
legal, not economic concept. As a result, we are supposed to make today’s 
trades based on yesterday’s information.”). 
95. Christopher Matthews, Why is Insider Trading Even Illegal?, Time (July 
26, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/07/26/why-is-insider-trading-even-
illegal/ [https://perma.cc/FGR7-MJ4X]. 
96. See generally George W. Dent, Why Legalized Insider Trading Would Be a 
Disaster, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 247, 272 (2013) (arguing that “the efficiency 
of stock markets depends on a steady flow of trading. Insider trading by 
issuers would discourage trading, with resultant damage to the efficiency of 
stock markets but no offsetting benefits to investors.”). 
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Importantly, the “Salman case . . . didn’t deal with a second aspect 
of Newman, which made it more difficult for prosecutors to pursue cases 
against traders who received confidential information second- or third-
hand.”97 Thus, the most important issue to address in this Part is the 
precise issue that Justice Alito avoided in the Salman opinion; namely, 
what courts should do in factually-difficult scenarios since “[d]etermi-
ning whether an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure 
. . . will not always be easy.”98 This Part scrutinizes three of these 
potential “personal benefit” scenarios. 
On October 5, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in 
Salman.99 During oral argument, two justices posed three separate ques-
tions to counsel concerning how the “personal benefit” test would apply 
in given hypothetical scenarios. To fully grasp how the “personal ben-
efit” test might apply in these scenarios post-Salman, we must further 
analyze them outside the constraints of oral argument.  
Initially, at the outset of the Government’s argument, Chief Justice 
Roberts raised the following hypothetical: What if a group of “people 
[are] all going away for the weekend, [and they say to the insider] why 
don’t you join us? [And the insider responds] I can’t, I’m working on 
this Google thing.”100 Justice Roberts remarked that “you wouldn’t call 
that a gift. You’d call it a social interchange. And maybe it’s . . . some-
thing he should have been more careful about saying, but it’s quite 
different than a gift.”101 This is thought-provoking for two reasons: (1) 
after this observation, Chief Justice Roberts asked the Government’s 
solicitor whether this would be a “personal benefit,” and the solicitor 
replied that it would not; and (2) Chief Justice Roberts declared that 
“however you read Dirks, it certainly doesn’t go beyond gifts.”102 
Naturally, Chief Justice Roberts observed that “it’s kind of a hazy 
line to draw . . . between something that you characterize as a gift and 
something that would be characterized as social interaction.”103 But 
Justice Breyer was not as muddled, because he stated that “if you give 
[inside information] to . . . anyone in the world . . . whom you happen 
to know, and you believe that person will trade on it, that is for a 
personal advantage.”104 It appears then, at least to Justice Breyer, that 
 
97. Viswanatha & Kendall, supra note 17. 
98. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016) (quoting Dirks, 463 
U.S. at 664). 
99. Oral Argument, supra note 9. 
100. Id. at 27:15. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 27:38. 
103. Id. at 28:46. 
104. Id. at 30:07. 
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the gravamen of the “personal benefit” test is whether the tipper be-
lieves that the tippee will trade on the information. In this case, it is 
necessary to ask why else would a tipper reveal inside information un-
less she expected the tippee to trade on it? Clearly, in this “social inter-
change,” the tipper did not intentionally reveal any information; but 
this type of innocuous banter is not what the securities laws are de-
signed to prevent. Rather, this hypothetical helps frame the actual evil 
to be remedied by an insider-trading prohibition: deterrence of tips by 
individuals who want “recognition,” pecuniary or otherwise, for provi-
ding a scarce resource.105 When we view information as a thing of value, 
it is easier to understand why the misuse of that information is a crime. 
By way of example, attorneys are often in the business of handling 
client funds. Further, probably all attorneys know folks who have fallen 
on hard times financially. But just because the attorney possesses the 
client funds does not mean the attorney can give the money away to 
the struggling folks she knows. The attorney is a fiduciary and must 
hold those funds in trust for her client. Inside information is no differ-
ent. The insider holds the information in trust for the corporation. In 
the context of the marketplace, bullish information means there is mo-
ney to be made and bearish information means there are losses to be 
avoided.106 Information, quite literally, has so many dollar signs attach-
ed to it that it might as well be hard currency. But whether that infor-
mation can benefit a needy person (or a not-so-needy person) in the 
insider’s circle (or not in their circle) is of no consequence because it 
does not belong to the insider, it belongs to the corporation. It isn’t for 
the insider to decide whether to reveal it because it doesn’t belong to 
them, and that’s why it’s a crime. The next hypothetical will further 
our understanding of why an insider (or tippee under the “misappropri-
ation doctrine”) who wants “recognition” for possessing information is 
actually receiving a “personal benefit,” and why a “recognition” test, 
rather than a “personal benefit” test, makes more sense for remote tip-
pees. 
Later in oral argument, Justice Alito raised the following hypo-
thetical: “Suppose . . . the insider is walking down the street and sees 
someone who has a really unhappy look on his face and says, I want to 
do something to make this person’s day. And so he provides the inside 
information to that person and says, you can make some money if you 
 
105. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
106. See generally Bearish and Bullish Definition, N. Am. Derivatives Exch., 
Inc., https://www.nadex.com/learning-center/glossary/bearish-and-bullish-
definition [https://perma.cc/82HJ-4ZPW] (last visited Feb. 16, 2017) 
(“Traders have long used the terms ‘bearish’ and ‘bullish’ to describe two 
things: their own feelings about a market and what they feel is a general 
mood in the market as a whole.”). 
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trade on this.”107 Justice Alito then asked the Government solicitor if 
this would be a violation of the “personal benefit” test, and the solicitor 
replied “yes.”108 The tipper in this scenario is not related to the person 
on the street; they are not even friends. In fact, they just met. But the 
tipper wants to bring some good fortune to this person on the street. 
And this is exactly what the law is designed to prevent: it may be 
factually difficult to prove that the tipper wanted “recognition” as the 
individual who cheered up the unhappy person on the street, but it will 
not be as difficult as proving that the tippee “knew” that the insider’s 
disclosure violated a fiduciary duty. A jury could infer from the tipper’s 
course of conduct that she wanted to “save the day” and cheer up the 
unhappy person on the street, and this amounts to “recognition.” 
“Recognition,” as a term of art, is distinct from the “gift theory” of 
liability. “Recognition” means that a tipper wants reputation or status 
as someone who is “in the know,” or as someone who has information 
no one else has. This is a “personal benefit” because, if insider trading 
was legal, insiders would prioritize their own interests over the interest 
of the firm, which is the entity that actually produces economic value. 
Clearly, society has a greater interest in the well-being of the firm than 
in the well-being of the insider. As Dent argues, “[t]he prospect of huge 
trading profits would tempt managers to alter many decisions, causing 
damage to the firm in ways that would be virtually impossible for cor-
porate monitors to detect.”109 And, as Langevoort explains, “[a] hard 
question in the law of insider trading is how to characterize the behavior 
of someone who we think should have known better but may have lack-
ed the contemporaneous appreciation ordinarily associated with scien-
ter.”110 The answer to these questions is a “recognition” based rule that 
seeks to establish the tipper’s reputation as someone who discloses re-
liable inside information. If each tippee that trades on information from 
a tipper who seeks “recognition”111 can be held liable, this should 
significantly deter even remote tippees from trading on information that 
the industry knows has been appropriated. 
 
107. Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 31:12. 
108. Id. at 31:34. 
109. Dent, supra note 96, at 248. 
110. Donald C. Langevoort, What Were They Thinking? Insider Trading and the 
Scienter Requirement, in Research Handbook On Insider Trading 52 
(Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013), http://scholarship.law.georgetown 
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2018&context=facpub [https://perma.cc/ 
YE2K-ZAL8]. 
111. Clearly, establishing this “recognition” would require wiretapping and other 
investigatory techniques that reveal what goes on behind closed doors. 
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A “recognition” based rule would prohibit disclosures that are not 
made for a corporate purpose, and under the “misappropriation doc-
trine,” any remote tippee who trades on illegally-disclosed information 
would subject themselves and the original tipper to liability. This is so 
because a successful trade, i.e. a gain or an avoided loss, would trace 
back to the information source and would give them “recognition” as 
someone who has valuable and reliable information. This type of “recog-
nition” gives someone status in market circles, and this is the type of 
circuity that has led to a culture of unfair advantage.112 
This “recognition” based rule is broader than the “gift theory” of 
liability because a tippee does not have to know that the tipper inten-
ded the disclosure to be a gift of information; the tippee only has to 
know that the information yielded a profit prior to public disclosure, 
which gives the tipper “recognition” as a dependable source. Once the 
tippee trades, both the tipper and the tippee are subject to liability 
whether or not they know of each other’s existence or motivations. If 
the Government can produce viable evidence of a tipper’s reputation in 
the industry, then there is no reason to eschew a “recognition” based 
rule that sweeps into remote-tippee territory in a way Salman couldn’t. 
Justice Alito also raised the last hypothetical, which was perhaps a 
tip-off that he would be the one to ultimately write the opinion: “So 
the person with inside information has had a few drinks at the country 
club and is talking to some friends and discloses the inside information 
[to them] . . . One of the friends then trades on the information. Now, 
what would you have to prove as to the mental state of the tipper and 
the tippee?”113 First, let us ask the question a second time, why would 
anyone reveal inside information unless they expected that someone 
might trade on it? After this last hypothetical, it is much clearer that 
individuals with inside information want “recognition” as someone who 
has a thing of value that others don’t have. If others can obtain value 
from this individual’s information, it puts them in a position of power 
as someone who possesses scarce resources. This is why insider trading 
is theft, because these scarce resources do not belong to the person who 
extracts the value from them, whether for themselves or another. 
There is a culture of insider trading on Wall Street that journalists 
have covered for a long time.114 There are people who “play the game” 
 
112. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Why Insider Trading is Wrong, N.Y. Times 
DealBook (Apr. 11, 2011, 3:51 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/ 
04/11/why-is-insider-trading-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/CUF2-YAPU] 
(explaining that Wall Street bankers, corporate lawyers, and FDA chemists 
have all taken advantage of inside information). 
113. Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 40:09. 
114. See, e.g., Patrick Radden Keefe, Making Insider Trading Legal, New 
Yorker (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/ 
making-insider-trading-legal [https://perma.cc/UPQ7-PVBY] (“Because 
there are so many hedge funds, each with its own army of analysts, the trick 
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and others who simply “play by the rules.” For instance, “[c]ompany 
insiders share tips for many reasons, not just financial compensation: 
the person they share the information with may be a friend or a family 
member, someone they want to impress, [or] someone they owe a fa-
vor.”115 In other words, the person who shares the information wants 
“recognition” for being the one who shared the information; they want 
to impress someone, help their friends or family, or make good on a 
previous debt, perhaps from a time someone gave them inside informa-
tion. If those who “play by the rules” and only trade on public informa-
tion are ever to enjoy the fruits of their integrity, Congress must pass 
legislation that sufficiently deters individuals who want “recognition” 
for tipping information that does not belong to them. This sounds a bit 
nebulous and more than a bit suspicious, but we won’t know the true 
damage caused by insider trading until we have clear guidelines that 
prosecutors can use to attack the problem at a macro level. 
There will always be the camps who believe that information is a 
private-property right, and in more than a few contexts it is, but when 
it comes to the publicly-traded securities of publicly-held companies, 
information belongs to everyone with a pension, 401(k), portfolio, or 
fund, regardless of the size, or those who are not currently trading in 
the market but someday desire to.116 The Salman Court did not extend 
the rule beyond the limits established in Dirks, nor should they have. 
In the name of separation of powers, this is a movement that Congress 
must spearhead. But, as a public policy matter, the time has come for 
the federal government to take a hardline stance on insider trading, 
because there’s no telling how many more Newman’s are waiting in the 
wings of appellate courts, and how many insiders are out there seeking 
“recognition” and industry status as players with reliable information. 
Conclusion 
The major takeaway from Salman is that the Court reaffirmed its 
narrow holding in Dirks: a gift of inside information to a trading relative 
or friend is enough to establish a “personal benefit” to the tipper. 
Outside of this narrow holding, however, Salman does not do much else. 
But that statement underscores Salman’s practical thrust, because as 
the Government’s solicitor explained during oral argument, the great 
majority of insider-trading cases involve a tip of inside information to 
a trading relative or friend.117 As far as legal rules are concerned, Salman 
 
is to find some nugget of information that the rest of the market doesn’t 
know. This is where the culture of insider trading took hold.”). 
115. Id. 
116. Law students are one group that immediately comes to mind. 
117. Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 45:00 (“This involves the classic, proto-
typical situation that actually arises in the real world and gets prosecuted. 
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is not groundbreaking; but in the grand scheme of insider-trading juris-
prudence, it validates the Government’s significant latitude to prose-
cute the most common situations in which insider trading occurs. 
Salman may not extend insider-trading liability to its logical van-
ishing point, but it should certainly give pause to those corporate insi-
ders willing to benefit their family and friends at the expense of the 
trading public and their own issuing corporations. A step towards a fair 
marketplace is always a step in the right direction, but critics who raise 
separation of powers and clarity concerns have legitimate qualms with 
the manner in which existing insider-trading jurisprudence has devel-
oped. Although the Salman Court undoubtedly reached the correct 
result in a legally-justifiable fashion, it is time for Congressional action 
to amend § 10(b) to clearly reflect that insider trading is a crime, and 
that it is a crime that necessitates a statute with a comprehensive 
sweep. Reports of rampant insider trading118 means some market partic-
ipants do not respect the law in its current form, and “if we desire 
respect for the law, we must first make the law respectable.”119 
James Walsh† 
 
There are very few cases that involve [the] hypothetical of somebody distri-
buting inside information [anonymously to many different people].”). 
118. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Study Asserts Startling Numbers of Insider Trading 
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